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$Title{Pearl Harbor:  Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal
Chapter XV    Final Appraisal of the Pearl Harbor Attack}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Wallin, VAdm. Homer N.}
$Affiliation{USN}
$Subject{japanese
harbor
pearl
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japan
war
attack
american
world
americans}
$Volume{}
$Date{1968}
$Log{}
Book:        Pearl Harbor:  Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal
Author:      Wallin, VAdm. Homer N.
Affiliation: USN
Date:        1968

Chapter XV    Final Appraisal of the Pearl Harbor Attack

1.  Japan's Mistake in Attacking Pearl Harbor

     In retrospect, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was a blessing for
both nations, if not for the world.  The "Day of Infamy" will long be
remembered, because at the time it seemed real and portentous.  Since that
time, a quarter century ago, the results of that attack appear insignificant
compared to the events which have since transpired.  What seemed a great
disaster at the time of Pearl Harbor has turned out to be a blessing in
disguise.  Tragically, it was the cheapest way in which a nation such as the
United States could become unified and could thereafter go forth as the
champion of liberty throughout the world.  The results of the war put an end
to many of the non-democratic governments in the world and at the same time
led the United States to take decisive action and world leadership.

     True enough, General Tojo and Admiral Yamamoto were bad news for a
peace-loving nation like the United States.  The Japanese people became
willing victims of a despotic militaristic regime which had never known
defeat, and which had attacked without warning in the Chinese War of 1895 and
the Russan war of 1905.  In later years they signed an agreement at The Hague
which prohibited such uncivilized practice.  Yet in 1941 they attacked Pearl
Harbor in peacetime without warning.  Through a miscalculation by their
diplomats in Washington, the half-hour's interval between the attack and the
final note ending further negotiations turned out to be a warning which was
received more than an hour after the event.

     The militaristic faction in Japan had been successful in their program of
territorial and economic expansion.  They had occupied a portion of Manchuria,
Hankow, Shanghai, the island of Hainan, and Indo-China, and they had driven
many foreigners out of China.  Their expressed concern for international amity
and goodwill was not sincere.  They yearned for the riches of Southeast Asia
and their golden opportunity for further expansion arrived in 1941 when the
Axis Powers, Germany and Italy, were apparently successful in their programs
of expansion.  It was Tojo who declared to a willing people that "Japan's
destiny is to return Asia to Asians."  Though certain elements in Japan,
including the Emperor, cautioned peace, the country had gone so far that it
could not draw back without a loss of face.  This was impossible, especially
when Japan's military power was fully poised, trained, and ready.

     The Japanese Fleet attacked Pearl Harbor in force, and the results seemed
calamitous then.  The military purpose was to immobilize the American Fleet so
that the American forces could not interfere with depredations in China or in
Southeast Asia.  The Japanese leaders accomplished their purpose, but the
purpose was wholly illusory when viewed in the context of later events.  The
question now arises:  What mistakes did Japan make in the attack on Pearl
Harbor?

     In the first place, the Japanese Commander of the attacking force felt
that his mission was completed, and that he should return to Japan as ordered.
It apparently did not occur to him that his planes could have destroyed the
thirty-eight cruisers and destroyers that remained afloat at Pearl Harbor, or
the reserve fuel oil supply of the fleet that would have immobilized the fleet
for months or even years.  His planes could have destroyed the mechanical
shops and drydocks which were indispensable to a fleet at war.  These
important adjuncts of military power were left intact.  Possibly they were
left to serve Japan at a later date in case they occupied Pearl Harbor.

     In the second place, the American Fleet was inferior to the Fleet of
Japan, especially in aircraft carriers and aviators.  If the Americans did
intervene, where could they strike without undue risk from submarines and
land-based aircraft?  The Rainbow Plan called for the fleet to attack the
Marshall and Caroline Islands and to establish a fleet base there.  Could this
be done without great risk to the American Fleet?  Even if successful, what
impact would it have had upon the Japanese in their invasion of China,
Indo-China, Malaya, or Indonesia?

     If the Japanese had warned the Americans of the intended attack even a
few days in advance, would the situation have been any better?  Perhaps our
land-based Army planes could have given a good account of themselves.  The
losses to the Japanese would undoubtedly have increased, but the losses of our
side in terms of ships and aviation manpower could have been much greater.  A
fleet action would hardly have been in our favor, for we would have only two
carriers in the Central Pacific against six Japanese carriers.  Some of our
battleships and cruisers would certainly have been deep water victims.  The
losses could easily have exceeded those suffered at Pearl Harbor, and would
have been final in most cases.

     On 3 April 1965 Fleet Admiral Nimitz wrote to the Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral David L. McDonald, as follows:


     Several times in recent weeks I have been quoted correctly that "as bad
as our losses were at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 - they could have been
devastatingly worse" - had the Japanese returned for more strikes against our
naval installations, surface oil storage and our submarine base installations.
Such attacks could have been made with impunity as we had little left to
oppose them.  Furthermore - I have been correctly quoted in saying that it was
God's divine will that Kimmel did not have his fleet at sea to intercept the
Japanese Carrier Task Force that attacked P. H. on 7 Dec 1941.  That task
force had a fleet speed at least 2 knots superior to our speed - and Kimmel
could not have brought the Japanese to a gun action unless they wanted it.  We
might have had one carrier but I doubt if the Lexington could have joined in
time.  Picture if you can - 6 Japanese carriers working on our old ships which
would be without air cover - or - had the Japanese wanted to avoid American
air attacks from shore - they could have delayed the action until out of range
of shore based air.  Instead of having our ships sunk in the shallow protected
waters of P. H. they could have been sunk in deep water - and we could have
lost ALL of our trained men instead of the 3800 approx. lost at P. H.  There
would have been few trained men to form the nucleus of the crews for the new
ships nearing completion.  Not only were the ships of the enemy task force
faster - they were more modern - and the Japanese main fleet under Yamamoto
was in the rear - in support - if needed.  Nagumo, the Commander of the P. H.
Attack Force - missed a great chance by not following up his attack . . .

     The greatest mistake was purely psychological.  The attack on Pearl
Harbor solidified a people against Japan and her allies and brought about the
greatest miracle of production that the world has seen.  Before that happened,
the people were divided in their feelings toward Japan and toward the Axis
Powers.  There was some sympathy for Japan.  Going to war to interfere with
her exploits in China and Southeast Asia would have failed to arouse a
patriotic spirit among Americans.  But the unprincipled attack on Pearl Harbor
changed the people entirely; they were now committed to an all-out war with
"unconditional surrender" as the objective.

2.  Other Mistakes Made by the Japanese

     For a military government to make the mistakes made by Japan is almost
inconceivable.  In addition, Japan did not use well the superiority which she
possessed.  Besides underestimating the power of an aroused America, the
military leaders of the Japanese failed to gauge the potential of a great
country at war.  They assumed that the Americans would grow tired of the
struggle and be content to let Japan keep her ill-gotten gains.  No greater
mistake could be conceived with regard to the true character of the American
people, in that age or any age.

     Overexpansion was without doubt the greatest error of Japan.  The first
steps of the war were so easy that the leaders departed from the original plan
and included parts of Alaska, Midway, and Australia in their projected
empire.  The result was that when the real tests came they were unable to
defend the expanded perimeter against their newly-made enemy.

     They assumed that they had insured security of their codes.  Yet before
Pearl Harbor we had broken the diplomatic code, which was of inestimable value
to Americans and their allies.

     The military leaders of Japan failed to protect their shipping
adequately.  Our submarines were able to make intolerable inroads on Japanese
merchant ships.  In contrast, we lost very few ships to Japanese submarines in
the Eastern Pacific or elsewhere.  This all points to the fact that they
failed to use properly their large fleet of submarines.

     We give the Japanese credit for the early-day efficiency which they
displayed.  At Guadalcanal their destroyers were adept in the use of the "Long
Tom" torpedo which had a far greater explosive force than our weapons.  They
also excelled at first in night action.  True, the Japanese were on the
offensive and could select the time and place for the sea battles which
ensued.

     Yet, at Guadalcanal the real caliber of American sea power and American
character were shown.  As we see it now, the Japanese were eventually turned
back at Guadalcanal, as they were at Midway.  The turning point of that great
war occurred at Midway in June 1942 and at Guadalcanal after August 1942.
They retreated from Alaska in the fall of 1942.

     The Japanese were not lacking in patriotism or willingness to die for
their Emperor.  If the atomic bombs had not been dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki it is possible that millions of Americans would have been lost in
their effort to take the homeland from a relentless and fanatical foe.  An
amphibious assault on the Japanese homeland would have been very costly to the
Japanese as well as to the Americans.

     In retrospect, we are thankful that America was with God during the
ordeal which tried men's souls.  In many ways, He showed that the right
prevails over the wrong, provided that the right side perseveres.  Truly it
has been said that right motives give pinions to thought, and strength and
freedom to speech and action.  This is especially true of those who strive to
perform the right.  The final surrender of the hordes represented by Hitler,
Mussolini, and the Japanese militarists, proved unmistakably that the power of
God is on the side which is nearest right.

3.  United States' Aversion to War

     Through the years of 1920-1940 the people of the United States were
strongly opposed to war.  Isolationism was rampant.  World War I was a great
victory for America and the western democracies as a whole, but at a fearful
cost.  It was only when England was near collapse and Japan was taking over
China and Southeast Asia that the people of America awoke to the real facts of
international life.  The American people gradually came to the realization
that it was impossible to withdraw from the world or avoid its problems.  Such
is the way of a leading democratic society.  Such is an inherent
responsibility of a great world power.  Even with this realization there were
divisive forces in the body politic.

     In the 1920's and early 1930's the people had elected representatives in
Congress who believed as they believed.  The result was that disarmament was
popular and preparedness was anathema.  Consequently there was a minimum of
money for the armed forces.  The Army and Marine Corps were on a starvation
diet and few new ships were ordered for the Navy prior to Roosevelt's
Presidency.  Even when the situation became ominous in 1940, and it was
apparent that the world was about to be taken over by predatory forces, it was
impossible to make up for the years of neglect.  The forces of 'peace at any
price' were still powerful in Congress, and the majority of people was adamant
in their aversion to war.

     That state of mind did not persist among our citizens after the bombing
of Pearl Harbor.  The isolationists in our populace became patriotic
Americans.  Even the Japanese who were American citizens gave an outstanding
account of themselves.  The sons and daughters of all Americans went to war in
the global conflict which ensued.  Those who remained at home put their
shoulders to the wheel and the world witnessed the marvel of wartime
productions.

     A few years later, when approving the 1945 Navy Court of Inquiry on the
Pearl Harbor attack, President Truman made the following statement:

     I have read it very carefully, and I came to the conclusion that the
whole thing is the result of the policy which the country itself pursued.  The
country was not ready for preparedness.  Every time the President made an
effort to get a preparedness program through the Congress, it was stifled.
Whenever the President made a statement about the necessity of preparedness he
was vilified for doing it.  I think the country is as much to blame as any
individual in this final situation that developed in Pearl Harbor.